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Abstract—In this paper, we pioneer the study of physical-layer
security in heterogeneous networks (HetNets). We investigate se-
cure communications in a two-tier downlink HetNet, which com-
prises one macrocell and several femtocells. Each cell has multiple
users and an eavesdropper attempts to wiretap the intended
macrocell user. First, we consider an orthogonal spectrum allo-
cation strategy to eliminate co-channel interference, and propose
the secrecy transmit beamforming only operating in the macro-
cell (STB-OM) as a partial solution for secure communication
in HetNet. Next, we consider a secrecy-oriented non-orthogonal
spectrum allocation strategy and propose two cooperative STBs
which rely on the collaboration amongst the macrocell base station
(MBS) and the adjacent femtocell base stations (FBSs). Our first
cooperative STB is the STB sequentially operating in the macrocell
and femtocells (STB-SMF), where the cooperative FBSs individu-
ally design their STB matrices and then feed their performance
metrics to the MBS for guiding the STB in the macrocell. Aiming
to improve the performance of STB-SMF, we further propose the
STB jointly designed in the macrocell and femtocells (STB-JMF),
where all cooperative FBSs feed channel state information to
the MBS for designing the joint STB. Unlike conventional STBs
conceived for broadcasting or interference channels, the three pro-
posed STB schemes all entail relatively sophisticated optimizations
due to QoS constraints of the legitimate users. To efficiently use
these STB schemes, the original optimization problems are refor-
mulated and convex optimization techniques, such as second-order
cone programming and semidefinite programming, are invoked to
obtain the optimal solutions. Numerical results demonstrate that
the proposed STB schemes are highly effective in improving the
secrecy rate performance of HetNet.
Index Terms—Beamforming, femtocell, nonconvex optimiza-
tion, heterogeneous network, physical-layer security, semidefinite
programming (SDP).
I. INTRODUCTION
W ITH the rapid proliferation of smart phones, tablets andmachine-to-machine communications, there is an ever-
increasing demand for seamless wireless coverage, extremely
high mobile data rate and reliable secrecy performance [1].
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Aiming to effectively enhance the spectral and/or energy ef-
ficiency of wireless networks, it has been suggested that the
deployment density of various network-nodes should increase
[2], [3], and smart access-point activation and resource man-
agement are essential to utilize the dense network-nodes [4].
Therefore, heterogeneous network (HetNet) [5], [6] has been
attracting great research interests, and it is regarded as one of
the most promising techniques for providing higher network
capacity and wider coverage. HetNet is supported by various
types of base stations with different transmit power budgets.
Macrocell base stations (MBSs) provide public access and wide
area coverage up to a few kilometers to all the marcocell users
(MUs). Small cell base stations, such as femtocell base stations
(FBSs), are typically overlaid on the existing macrocells and in-
stalled in the building or indoor environment close to femtocell
users (FUs). It is noted that the network architecture of HetNet
becomes more open and diverse compared to the conventional
single-tier cellular networks, which makes the information ex-
change more susceptible to eavesdropping. Recently, physical-
layer security (PLS) has been proposed as a family of viable
techniques to secure wireless communications [7], [8], and it
also has the potential to tackle the security problem encountered
in HetNet.
Traditionally, the security problem in wireless networks was
mainly studied at higher layers using key-based cryptographic
methods [9]. This conventional wisdom relies on the assump-
tion that the eavesdropper is not computationally powerful to
break the secret key. However, as the computational capability
of wireless devices develops rapidly, perfect security can be
hardly guaranteed with the key-based solutions. It is reasonable
to argue that security measures should be invoked at all layers
where they can be implemented in a cost-effective manner.
Notably, the physical layer has remained almost ignored for
security in the past. The basic idea of PLS is to exploit the
randomness of wireless channel for secure message trans-
mission [10]. The authors in [8], [11], [12] investigated the
PLS in single-antenna fading channels. Since then, the secure
communication in multi-antenna channels has been extensively
studied [13]–[19] and in particular, practical and robust multi-
antenna secrecy beamforming schemes were investigated in
[19] very recently. Secure broadcasting with more than two
receivers were considered in [20]–[22]. Other related works in
the contexts of the multiple-access channel with confidential
messages [23], the Gaussian multiple-access wiretap channel
[24], and the cognitive multiple-access channel with confiden-
tial messages [25] have also been reported. Recently, there
are growing research interests in the secrecy communication
over interference channels, where the interference may be
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potentially exploited for improving the secrecy performance.
More specifically, in [26], the authors studied the inner and
outer bounds for the secrecy capacity regions of a two-user
interference network where the receivers are potentially eaves-
droppers. The secrecy rate of a two-user interference network
with an external eavesdropper was investigated in [27]. The
MIMO Gaussian interference channel with confidential mes-
sages was studied in [28] using game-theoretic approach. The
authors of [29] addressed the problem of minimizing the trans-
mit power with imperfect channel state information (CSI) in a
K-user multiple-input single-output interference network, and
the so-called “S-procedure” was applied. It should be noted that
the existing works on PLS mainly focus on traditional network
architectures, and the research on PLS for HetNet is still largely
missing.
Because of the densely overlaid network architecture, there
is ubiquitous interference of various types existing in HetNet
[30]. From the viewpoint of PLS, deliberately introducing in-
terference can be beneficial for the secrecy rate performance of
the system [10]. Inspired by this insight, the interference should
be utilized, rather than avoided, to improve the secrecy rate in
HetNet using techniques such as proper spectrum allocation
and cooperative beamforming. To elaborate a little further,
motivated by the inter-cell interference coordination techniques
[31]–[35], spectrum allocation can be rearranged dynamically
in conjunction with various levels of cooperation between the
network nodes, such as the MBS and FBSs, to generate the
desired co-channel interference (CCI) to the eavesdropper. As
a result, judicious cooperative beamforming schemes may be
designed to cope with CCI for the sake of improving the secrecy
rate performance in HetNet.
In this paper, a two-tier downlink HetNet system is consid-
ered, where MBS and FBSs serve the corresponding legitimate
MUs and FUs, and an MU acts maliciously as an eavesdropper
to wiretap another legitimate MU. For the considered scenario,
we propose three secrecy transmit beamforming (STB) schemes
in conjunction with two spectrum allocation schemes for secure
communications in the HetNet, assuming different degrees of
cooperation among the network nodes. As an initial study, we
first consider the conventional orthogonal spectrum allocation
(OSA) strategy [36], where orthogonal spectrum resources are
allocated to the MBS and the adjacent FBSs to eliminate the
cross-tier interference and the interference among adjacent
femtocells. Employing OSA, the considered scenario can be
simplified as the secure communication in a broadcasting chan-
nel, and we consider the STB only performed in macrocell
(STB-OM) as a partial solution for the secure communication
in HetNet. It is noted that STB-OM aims to maximize the
secrecy rate of the intended MU subject to the quality of
service (QoS) constraints of the other legitimate MUs, and
no cooperation between the MBS and FBSs is necessary. In-
spired by the fact that friendly interference can help secure
communication [10], we deliberately introduce interference in
the HetNet with the secrecy-oriented non-orthogonal spectrum
allocation (SONOSA) strategy, which dynamically changes the
local pattern of the underlay OSA. Specifically, some coop-
erative FBSs adjacent to the eavesdropper are assigned with
the same frequency resource as MBS, while the OSA strategy
still applies to the non-cooperative FBSs. Consequently, CCI is
deliberately introduced around the eavesdropper to enable more
effective cooperative STB. Specifically, two STB schemes are
proposed in conjunction with SONOSA, where MBS performs
STB in collaboration with its cooperative co-channel FBSs.
Firstly, a STB scheme is proposed to improve STB-OM with
a little cross-tier cooperation, which is sequentially performed
in macrocell and femtocells (STB-SMF). In this scheme, each
cooperative FBS designs its STB to altruistically maximize the
generated interference to the eavesdropper while serving its
own FUs. Then each cooperative FBS calculates a performance
metric and feeds it back to the MBS to facilitate the STB
in macrocell, and the MBS can still use the STB-OM with
minor modification. To improve the overall performance of
STB-SMF, another STB is proposed with the limited cross-
tier cooperation, which is jointly performed in macrocell and
femtocells (STB-JMF). In this scheme, each cooperative FBS
feeds its CSI back to the MBS for the joint STB, which aims
to guarantee the QoS requirements of both MUs and FUs while
enhancing the secrecy rate of the intended MU.
For the sake of clarity, the main contributions of this paper
are summarized as follows:
1) Upon adopting the OSA strategy, an STB-OM scheme is
proposed to secure the broadcast channel of the macrocell,
where the confidential message and the common messages
are simultaneously transmitted. In particular, an iterative
algorithm is proposed to maximize the secrecy rate while
satisfying the QoS of the common messages. To handle the
complicated optimization problem, we transform the orig-
inal nonconvex problem into a second-order cone program
(SOCP) with the aid of a first-order Taylor approximation.
The approximation can be improved with each iteration.
Therefore, a local optimum of the original optimization
problem can be obtained in several iterations. It is noted
that the proposed STB-OM is different from the con-
ventional STB schemes in the broadcasting channel [37],
[38], where only the confidential message transmission is
considered. Furthermore, the STB-OM is applicable to the
general single cell scenarios and does not need cooperation
between the MBS and FBSs, which also initiates our
cooperative STB exploiting CCI.
2) Based on the SONOSA strategy, a STB-SMF scheme
is proposed to improve the secrecy rate of STB-OM
while guaranteeing the QoS requirements of legitimate
MUs. Different from the traditional jamming sources [39],
the cooperative FBSs still serve their FUs while helping
the MBS. To enhance the secrecy rate performance of the
intended MU, the cooperative FBSs selflessly increase
the interference power towards the eavesdropper without
considering the QoS of their FUs, and the optimization
problem is efficiently solved by SOCP. It is worth point-
ing out that each cooperative FBS designs its STB with
local CSI, and only a scalar is fed back to the MBS
for its STB in macrocell, where the MBS can still adopt
STB-OM. Therefore, the STB-SMF scheme imposes very
little overhead for the cross-tier cooperation, and is com-
patible with STB-OM.
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3) Employing SONOSA strategy, an STB-JMF scheme is
proposed to strike a better balance between the secret-rate
performance of the intended MUs and the QoS require-
ments of the legitimate MUs and FUs. It is noted that
such complicated optimization is nonconvex, and we opt
for reformulating it into a tractable two-stage problem.
Specifically, we first fix the signal-to-interference-plus-
noise ratio (SINR) of the eavesdropper to formulate the
inner stage problem, which can be further transformed
into a tractable semidefinite program (SDP) by applying
the semidefinite relaxation technique. Then, we perform a
one-dimensional search to solve the outer stage problem,
which finds the most suitable SINR of the eavesdropper to
optimize the original objective. It is noted that the MBS
only needs to collect the CSI from its cooperative FBSs
for this joint STB, and such cross-tier cooperation imposes
acceptable overhead for the backhaul. Furthermore, unlike
the altruistic STB of the cooperative FBSs in STB-SMF,
the STB-JMF shceme guarantees the QoS of the FUs
in the cooperative FBSs.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section II,
the downlink HetNet system model and the corresponding
spectrum allocation strategies are presented, and we derive
SINR expressions of various network nodes for the following
beamforming design. Based on the two spectrum allocation
strategies, three STB schemes are proposed in Section III,
where the related optimization problems are formulated and
solved. In Section IV, simulation results show the effectiveness
of the proposed algorithms. Finally, conclusions and future
directions are provided in Section V.
Notations: Bold upper and lower case letters denote matrices
and vectors, respectively. Transpose and conjugate transpose
are denoted by (·)T and (·)H , respectively, while E{·} repre-
sents expectation. Tr(·) is the trace operator, ‖ · ‖ represents the
Euclidean norm, | · | denotes the mode of a complex number,
and rank(·) stands for the rank of a matrix. X  0 indicates
that X is Hermitian positive semidefinite. C represents the
field of complex numbers. Re(·) and Im(·) denote the real
part and the imaginary part of a complex number, respectively.
Additionally, the integer set {1, 2, . . . ,K} is abbreviated as
[1,K]. CN (μ, σ2) denotes a complex Gaussian variable with
mean μ and variance σ2.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
We consider a downlink HetNet as shown in Fig. 1. There
is one NM -antenna MBS at the center, and M single-antenna
MUs are randomly distributed throughout the macrocell cover-
age area, where we have NM > M , while the single-antenna
eavesdropper intends to wiretap the confidential message trans-
mitted to a legitimate MU. Additionally, F NF -antenna FBSs
are spatially distributed according to a homogeneous Poisson
point process and each FBS aims to serve K single-antenna
FUs, where we have NF > K. To simplify the analysis, we
assume that the transmit power of each FBS is fixed and equal,
denoted by PF . Similar to that of the FBSs, the transmit power
of the MBS is assumed to be PM . Other relevant variables are
defined in Table I.
Fig. 1. Downlink HetNet system model, comprising a macrocell and N
femtocells. The macrocell consists of a MBS, M legitimate MUs and an
eavesdropper. Each FBS servesK FUs.
TABLE I
LIST OF THE MAJOR VARIABLES
Two spectrum allocation strategies are developed in this
paper, i.e., the OSA strategy and the SONOSA strategy.
Serving as the underlay spectrum allocation strategy, OSA
allocates orthogonal spectrum resources to the MBS and the
adjacent FBSs to eliminate the cross-tier interference as well as
the interference among adjacent femtocells [36]. Building upon
OSA, SONOSA dynamically changes the local pattern of OSA
to enable advanced cooperative STB schemes. Specifically,
the SONOSA strategy assigns the same frequency resource
occupied by the MBS to the FBSs which are adjacent to the
eavesdropper, as shown in Fig. 2. Employing SONOSA, the
co-channel FBSs can work in collaboration with the MBS to
generate interference to the eavesdropper while serving their
own FUs.
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Fig. 2. An example for OSA and SONOSA, where the polygons with the same
color denote the femtocells with the same frequency resource, the apple-green
triangle is MBS, the cell phone is the eavesdropped MU and the ear denotes
the eavesdropper. It is noted that OSA is the underlay strategy, and SONOSA
dynamically changes the local pattern of OSA. Three apple-green femtocells
are assigned with the same frequency resource as the macrocell to generate
CCI against the eavesdropper.
Considering SONOSA, we assume that there are N
(1 ≤ N < F ) cooperative FBSs employing CCI to improve the
secrecy rate of the eavesdropped MU. Let us denote the n-th
cooperative FBS of the MBS as FBSn and the m-th MU as
MUm, then the received signal at MUm is given by
ym = hmwmsm +
M∑
q=1,q =m
hmwqsq
+
N∑
n=1
K∑
k=1
hn,mwnksnk + nm, m ∈ [1,M ], (1)
where hm ∈ C1×NM and hn,m ∈ C1×NF denote the channel
vector from the MBS to MUm and the channel vector from
the FBSn to MUm, respectively.1 wm ∈ CNM×1 and sm
represent the precoding vector and the message symbol
intended for MUm, respectively. Similarly, wnk ∈ CNF×1
and snk are the precoding vector and the message signal
intended for the k-th FU of the n-th cooperative FBS, denoted
as FUnk. nm is the Gaussian noise following independent
and identically distributed (i.i.d.) CN (0, σ2M ) at MUm. The
precoding vectors for the MUs satisfy the power constraint
of
∑M
m=1 ‖wm‖2 = PM and the precoding vectors for
the FUs in a femtocell satisfy the power constraint of∑K
k=1 ‖wnk‖2 = PF . Without loss of generality, we assume
1In this paper, we just assume perfect CSI as our first step to get fundamental
insights into the physical layer security problem in HetNet. We will consider a
more practical model including imperfect CSI in our future work.
that there is an eavesdropper wiretapping MU1,2 therefore the
received signal at the eavesdropper is given by
yE = hEw1s1 +
M∑
m=2
hEwmsm
+
N∑
n=1
K∑
k=1
hn,Ewnksnk + nE , (2)
where hE ∈ C1×NM denotes the channel vector from the MBS
to the eavesdropper, hn,E ∈ C1×NF is the channel vector
from FBSn to the eavesdropper, and nE is the Gaussian noise
obeying i.i.d. CN (0, σ2E) at the eavesdropper. Furthermore, the
received signal at FUnk can be formulated as
ynk = hn,nkwnksnk +
K∑
t=1,t =k
hn,nkwntsnt
+
N∑
p=1,p =n
K∑
t=1
hp,nkwptspt +
M∑
m=1
hnkwmsm + nnk, (3)
where hn,nk ∈ C1×NF is the channel vector from FBSn to
FUnk, hnk ∈ C1×NM is the channel vector form MBSn to FUk,
and the Gaussian noise nnk at FUnk follows i.i.d. CN (0, σ2F ).
To facilitate the analysis of secrecy rate performance, we
define the SINR of MUm as
SINRm =
|hmwm|2
Am
, m ∈ [1,M ], (4)
where
Am =
M∑
q=1,q =m
|hmwq|2 +
N∑
n=1
K∑
k=1
|hn,mwnk|2 + σ2M .
Similarly, the SINR of the eavesdropper is represented as
SINRE =
|hEw1|2
BE
, (5)
where
BE =
M∑
m=2
|hEwm|2 +
N∑
n=1
K∑
k=1
|hn,Ewnk|2︸ ︷︷ ︸
IFTsum
+σ2E ,
and IFTsum is the sum of the additional interference tempera-
ture from all the cooperative FBSs to the eavesdropper. Finally,
the SINR of the FUnk is written as
SINRnk =
|hn,nkwnk|2
Cnk
, n ∈ [1, N ], k ∈ [1,K], (6)
2Similar to [40], we focus on the beamforming design in this paper. The
identification problem—how to identify which MU has been intercepted by
the eavesdropper—is challenging and important, which will be investigated
in detail in our future work. In principle, this problem can be solved by
authentication: the MBS may broadcast some test messages to each MU in a
round-robin manner, and ask each of them to feed back what has been listened.
For the wiretapped MU, the MBS will receive feedback from two sources.
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where
Cnk =
K∑
t=1,t =k
|hn,nkwnt|2 +
N∑
p=1,p =n
K∑
t=1
|hp,nkwpt|2
+
M∑
m=1
|hnkwm|2 + σ2F .
After the above preliminary derivations, we will propose
three STB schemes in the next section to maximize the secrecy
rate of the intended MU1.
III. SECURITY TRANSMIT BEAMFORMING
SCHEMES FOR HetNet
In this section, we propose three secrecy communication
schemes to improve the secrecy rate of HetNet by jointly
considering the spectrum allocation strategy and the transmit
beamforming. Firstly, based on the OSA strategy, we propose
the STB-OM scheme as a partial solution for secure commu-
nication in HetNet. Then, we employ the SONOSA strategy to
propose the STB-SMF scheme, which improves STB-OM with
secrecy-oriented CCI generated by the altruistic cooperative
FBSs. At last, aiming at a balanced system performance, we
propose the STB-JMF scheme, which optimizes the security-
rate of the intended MU while satisfying the QoS constraints
of both legitimate MUs and FUs. In the remaining part of this
section, we will discuss each STB scheme in detail. Note that
in all the three proposed schemes, we assume that the local CSI
of the MUs and of the eavesdropper is available at the MBS,3
and each FBS knows the local CSI of its own femtocell.
A. Secrecy Transmit Beamforming Only Performed in
Macrocell (STB-OM)
Let us first discuss the STB-OM scheme that relies on
the OSA strategy. Because different frequency resources are
allocated to the MBS and FBSs, no CCI exists in this scheme.
As shown in Fig. 3, the MBS serves multiple legitimate MUs,
and we assume that MU1 is wiretapped by the eavesdropper.
Our goal is to maximize the secrecy rate of MU1 while guar-
anteeing the QoS, i.e., SINR, requirements of other legitimate
MUs. The proposed STB-OM scheme is aiming at the secrecy
rate maximization. Unfortunately, this optimization problem,
formulated as (7a) to (7c), is non-convex and hence prohibitive
computational complexity may be incurred for finding its opti-
mum solution. As a compromise, we employ a low-complexity
iterative algorithm [41] which conservatively approximates the
original problem as several tractable SOCP subproblems. In the
remaining part of this subsection, the details of the problem
formulation and solution are provided.
Initially, the secrecy rate optimization problem of STB-OM
can be formulated as
3Similar to [14], [15], [19], and [37], we assume that the CSI of the
eavesdropper is also available at the MBS to make the STB more tractable.
Fig. 3. An example channel model for the STB-OM scheme, consisting of
one MBS, M = 2 MUs and one eavesdropper wiretaps the first MU. As the
OSA is employed, the system is equivalent to a broadcast system. The solid
lines indicate useful data streams, and the dash line indicates the interference
stream.
max
{wm}Mm=1
log(1 + SINR1)− log(1 + SINRE) (7a)
s.t. SINRm ≥ γm, m ∈ [2,M ], (7b)
M∑
m=1
‖wm‖2 ≤ PM , (7c)
where the received SINRs from (4) and (5), that are associated
with MUm and the eavesdropper, can be simplified as
SINRm =
|hmwm|2
σ2M +
∑M
q=1,q =m |hmwq|2
, (8)
and
SINRE =
|hEw1|2
σ2E +
∑M
m=2 |hEwm|2 + IFTsum
, (9)
respectively, when the OSA strategy is adopted. Note that
the IFTsum in this STB-OM is zero, because OSA does not
introduce CCI. The constraint (7b) is the QoS requirements
of the other legitimate MUs, i.e., MUm,m ∈ [2,M ], and (7c)
represents the total transmit power constraint at the MBS. To
make the above problem more tractable, we introduce a pair
of slack variables t1 and t2. Then, the original problem can be
equivalently reformulated as
max
{wm}Mm=1,t1,t2
log(t1) + log(t2) (10a)
s.t. 1 + SINR1 ≥ t1, (10b)
1 + SINRE ≤ 1/t2, (10c)
SINRm ≥ γm, m ∈ [2,M ], (10d)
M∑
m=1
‖wm‖2 ≤ PM . (10e)
Without loss of generality, in the following, we assume σ2M =
σ2E = σ
2
F = σ
2 = 1. Substituting (8) and (9) into the above
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problem, (10) can be transformed as follows
max
{wm}Mm=1,t1,t2
t1t2 (11a)
s.t. 1 +
M∑
m=2
wHmH1wm ≤
wH1 H1w1
t1 − 1 , (11b)
1 +
M∑
m=1
wHmHEwm
≤ 1 +
∑M
m=2w
H
mHEwm
t2
, (11c)
γm
⎛
⎝1 + M∑
q=1,q =m
wHq Hmwq
⎞
⎠
≤ wHmHmwm, m ∈ [2,M ], (11d)
M∑
m=1
‖wm‖2 ≤ PM , (11e)
where we introduce the matrices H1 = hH1 h1, Hm = hHmhm,
HE = h
H
EhE . It is noted the logarithm function is removed
because of its monotonically increasing property. As we can
see, the right-hand side of the constraints (11b) and (11c) are
both quadratic-over-linear functions which are convex [42].
However, both constraints remain non-convex because they
are expressed as the form of f1(x) ≤ f2(x), namely f1(x)−
f2(x) ≤ 0, where f1(x) and f2(x) are both convex functions.
More specifically, it is well known that the sum of convex func-
tions is convex. Then, f1(x)− f2(x) is non-convex. Following
the idea of the constrained convex procedure [41], we replace
these quadratic-over-linear functions with their corresponding
first-order expansions, and then the problem can be transformed
into a convex one. Specifically, we define
FA,a(w, x) =
wHAw
x− a , (12)
where x ≥ a, A  0. The first-order Taylor expansion of (12)
at a certain point (w˜, x˜) is given by
QA,a(w, x, w˜, x˜) =
2Re{w˜HAw}
x˜− a −
w˜HAw˜
(x˜− a)2 (x− a).
(13)
Furthermore, it is noted that max t1t2 can be transformed into a
SOCP representation, e.g., max t0 with an additional constraint
‖[2t0, (t1 − t2)]‖ ≤ t1 + t2. This transformation is based
on the fact that the constraint t1t2 ≥ t20 is equivalent to
‖[2t0, (t1 − t2)]‖ ≤ t1 + t2, where we have t1 ≥ 0 and t2 ≥ 0.
Based on the above preparations, for the point (w˜, x˜), the prob-
lem (11) can then be transformed into a convex optimization
problem as follows
max
{wm}Mm=1,t0,t1,t2
t0 (14a)
s.t. 1 +
M∑
m=2
wHmH1wm
≤ QH1,1(w1, t1, w˜1, t˜1), (14b)
1 +
M∑
m=1
wHmHEwm
≤ 2
t˜2
− t2
t˜22
+
M∑
m=2
QHE ,0(wm, t2, w˜m, t˜2),
(14c)
γm
⎛
⎝1 + M∑
q=1,q =m
wHq Hmwq
⎞
⎠
≤ wHmHmwm,m ∈ [2,M ], (14d)
M∑
m=1
‖wm‖2 ≤ PM , (14e)
‖[2t0, (t1 − t2)]‖ ≤ t1 + t2. (14e)
Eventually, the problem can be converted to the following
SOCP form (15), shown at the bottom of the next page, where
the linear functions g1, g2, g3m are respectively defined as
g1 = QH1,1(w1, t1, w˜1, t˜1)− 1, (16)
g2 =
M∑
m=2
QHE ,0(wm, t2, w˜m, t˜2)− t2/t˜22 − 1, (17)
g3m = Re
(
wHmh
H
m
)
/
√
γm, m ∈ [2,M ]. (18)
It is noted the SOCP (15) can be solved efficiently by using
the available solvers such as CVX [43]. The proposed STB-OM
scheme is summarized by Algorithm 1 as follows.
Algorithm 1 STB-OM
1) Initialization: Set w˜m, t˜1 and t˜2 as the values which are
feasible to the problem (15).
2) Repeat:
Solve the SOCP problem (15) with (w˜m, t˜1, t˜2) and obtain
the optimal values (w∗m, t∗1, t∗2).
Update (w˜m, t˜1, t˜2) = (w∗m, t∗1, t∗2).
3) Until the convergence threshold is satisfied or the maximum
number of iterations is reached.
4) Output wm.
The original optimization problem of STB-OM is nonconvex
and NP-hard, thus its global optimum cannot be obtained with
polynomial computational complexity using any known algo-
rithm. By contrast, the proposed scheme, which is described
by Algorithm 1, employs the first order Taylor approximations
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Fig. 4. The convergence property of Algorithm 1 under different values of the
transmit power of the MBS.
to transform the original optimization problem into a convex
optimization problem. The globally optimal solution of the
resultant convex optimization problem can be obtained upon
using Algorithm 1, which, according to [41], can be proved
to converge to a local optimum of the original optimization
problem in a few steps.4
Remark 1: Since the optimization problem defined in (15)
is convex, the optimal solutions {w∗m}Mm=1, t∗0, t∗1, t∗2, are ob-
tained by solving (15) for a given (w˜m, t˜1, t˜2). At each
iteration, (w˜m, t˜1, t˜2) is updated based on the optimal solu-
tion (w∗m, t∗1, t∗2) obtained in the previous iteration. Hence,
(w˜m, t˜1, t˜2) is always a feasible solution of the current iter-
ation, and the value of t0 obtained for the given (w˜m, t˜1, t˜2)
will be larger than or equal to the value of t0 of the previous
iteration. This observation reveals that the required secrecy rate
4The performance gap between Algorithm 1 and the optimal scheme cannot
be provided at this stage due to the difficulty of obtaining the global optimum
of the original optimization problem. Nevertheless, when proper initial values
are given (although this is challenging as well), the local optimum achieved by
Algorithm 1 may be equal to the global optimum of the original problem.
will be monotonically increasing (or at least nondecreasing) at
each iteration, which is demonstrated by the numerical results
in Fig. 4. Due to the power constraint, there is an upper bound
for the achievable secrecy rate. Therefore, the convergence of
the proposed Algorithm 1 can be guaranteed.
Remark 2: It is clear that for the STB-OM, only the local CSI
is required at the MBS, including the CSI of MUs and the CSI
of the eavesdropper.
Remark 3: If an FU in a femtocell is wiretapped by an-
other FU in the same femtocell, the problem is mathematically
identical to that we have solved in this subsection. In other
words, the proposed approach is applicable to general single-
cell interference-free scenarios.
B. Secrecy Transmit Beamforming Sequentially Performed in
Macrocell and Femtocell (STB-SMF)
Compared to the conventional transmit beamforming without
the consideration of secrecy, the secrecy rate performance of
MU1 can be improved by the STB-OM for its clear objective.
In fact, we may further improve the secrecy rate performance
by designing more sophisticated approaches. As shown in [44],
it is potentially feasible to exploit interference for improving
the secrecy rate performance. To achieve this goal, judicious
interference management schemes could be developed. To jus-
tify these assumptions, a secrecy-oriented spectrum allocation
strategy, i.e., the proposed SONOSA, is invoked to introduce
deliberate CCI that is friendly with respect to the secrecy
rate performance of MU1. The SONOSA strategy dynamically
changes the local pattern of the underlay OSA to improve the
performance of STB-OM. Based on SONOSA, the coopera-
tive co-channel FBSs can act independently as the sources of
friendly CCI to degrade the performance of the eavesdrop-
per. Specifically, the cooperative FBSs selflessly maximize the
power of leakage interference imposed on the eavesdropper to
improve the secrecy rate performance of MU1. By exploiting
the null space beamforming technique at the cooperative FBSs,
the interference would only affect the eavesdropper’s received
signal.
max
{wm}Mm=1,t0,t1,t2
t0 (15a)
s.t.
∥∥∥[2wH2 hH1 , . . . , 2wHMhH1 , g1 − 1]T∥∥∥ ≤ g1 + 1, (15b)∥∥∥[2wH1 hHE , . . . , 2wHMhHE , g2 − 1]T∥∥∥ ≤ g2 + 1, (15c)∥∥∥[2wH1 hHm, . . . , 2wHm−1hHm, 2wHm+1hHm, . . . , 2wHMhHm, 2, g3m − 1]T∥∥∥ ≤ g3m + 1, (15d)
Im
(
wHmh
H
m
)
= 0, m ∈ [2,M ], (15e)∥∥∥[wT1 , . . . ,wTM ]T∥∥∥ ≤√PM , (15f)
‖[2t0, (t1 − t2)]‖ ≤ t1 + t2, (15g)
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Fig. 5. An example channel model for STB-SMF scheme, consisting of one
MBS, M = 2 MUs, N = 2 cooperative FBSs, and K = 1 FU at each femto-
cell. An eavesdropper wiretaps the first MU in the macrocell. As the SONOSA
is adopted, the channel model is equivalent to an interference channel model.
The black solid lines indicate useful data streams, and the black dash lines
indicate interference streams, which are optimized by STB-SMF. In particular,
the blue dotted lines indicate the feedback of interference temperatures from
FBSs to the MBS.
Here, as shown in Fig. 5, we develop a novel STB-SMF
scheme to exploit the interference in HetNet with SONOSA.
In what follows, we first discuss the STB design for the
n-th cooperative FBS FBSn, n ∈ [1, N ]. We consider that
FBSn transmits data streams in the null space of Gn =
[hTn,1,h
T
n,2, . . . ,h
T
n,M ]
T ∈ CM×NF , which is the collective
channels from FBSn to all legitimate MUs. To guarantee the
existence of the null space, NM > NF > M has to be satisfied.
As a consequence, the interference from FBSn would only
degrade the eavesdropper’s channel. To improve the secrecy
rate, we aim at maximizing the interference from FBSn to
the eavesdropper subject to the transmit power constraint. The
problem can be then formulated as follows
max
Wn
Tr
[
WHn Hn,EWn
] (19a)
s.t. Tr
[
WHn Wn
] ≤ PF , (19b)
GnWn = 0, (19c)
where Hn,E = hHn,Ehn,E , Wn = [wn,1,wn,2, . . . ,wn,K ],
and GnWn = 0 ensures that FBSn does not generate
interference to the legitimate MUs. To eliminate the
inter-cell inter-user interference of the K FUs served by
FBSn, the beamforming vectors of FBSn should also
satisfy wHn,khHn,nt = 0, k, t ∈ [1,K], k = t. Let us define
wn,k = Vnxn,k, where the columns of Vn constitute an
orthogonal basis for the null space of Gn. The optimization
problem (19) is then equivalent to
max
{xn,k}Kk=1
K∑
k=1
xHn,kR1nxn,k (20a)
s.t.
K∑
k=1
xHn,kR2nxn,k ≤ PF , (20b)
xHn,kV
H
n h
H
n,nt = 0, k, t ∈ [1,K], k = t, (20c)
where we have R1n = VHn Hn,EVn, and R2n = VHn Vn. The
above problem can be further transformed into a SOCP problem
by introducing a slack variable α as follows
max
{xn,k}Kk=1,α
α (21a)
s.t.
∥∥[hn,EVnxn,1, . . . ,hn,EVnxn,K ]T∥∥ ≤ α,
(21b)∥∥[Vnxn,1, . . . ,Vnxn,K ]T∥∥ ≤√PF , (21c)
xHn,kV
H
n h
H
n,nt = 0, k = t, k, t ∈ [1,K]. (21d)
As we can see, the problem (21) is a standard SOCP problem
and can be solved efficiently via some numerical solvers, such
as CVX [43]. For some special case, we can even obtain the
closed-form solution. For example, when the number of FU
served by FBSn is 1, i.e., K = 1, the problem (20) can be
simplified as
max
xn,1
xHn,1R1nxn,1
s.t. xHn,1R2nxn,1 ≤ PF . (22)
The optimal solution of (22) is given by x∗n,1 =
αφmax(R1n,R2n), where φmax(R1n,R2n) denotes
the generalized eigenvector corresponding to the largest
generalized eigenvalue of the matrix pair (R1n,R2n) and
α =
√
PF
(∥∥∥R 122nφmax(R1n,R2n)∥∥∥)−1. The optimal value
of the objective function (22) is PFλmax(R1n,R2n), where
λmax(R1n,R2n) is the largest generalized eigenvalue of
matrix pair (R1n,R2n). As a result, the optimal beamforming
vector can be expressed as w∗n,1 = Vnx∗n,1.
After designing the STB at the cooperative FBSs, we con-
tinue to design the STB at the MBS. It is noted that based on
the interference temperature generated by the cooperative FBSs
(cf. (5)), we can obtain the STB of the MBS by employing the
STB-OM with minor modification. Specifically, let us define
the interference temperature generated by FBSn at the eaves-
dropper as
IFTn =
K∑
k=1
∣∣hn,Ew∗n,k∣∣2 , (23)
then the sum of such interference from all N cooperative FBSs
is IFTsum =
∑N
n=1 IFTn. It should be noted that IFTsum is
calculated by the MBS, after receiving the feedback about
IFTn from FBSn. Then the MBS performs STB according to
STB-OM and IFTsum. For clarity, the proposed STB-SMF is
summarized by Algorithm 2 as follows.
Algorithm 2 STB-SMF
1) Obtain the beamforming vector w∗n,k of FBSn with (21) or
(22).
2) Each cooperative FBSn calculates IFTn (23) and transmit
it to the MBS.
3) The MBS calculates IFTsum =
∑N
n=1 IFTn and obtains the
beamforming vector of the MBS according to the STB-OM
in Algorithm 1.
Remark 4: It is worth mentioning that each cooperative FBS
only needs to send a scalar IFTsum to the MBS in this scheme.
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Hence, STB-SMF only incurs a small increase of the backhaul
traffic loads. Furthermore, only the local CSI is required at each
FBS. In contrast, the local CSI and the interference temperature
are required at the MBS.
Remark 5: In the STB-SMF, we take the QoS constraints
of MUs into consideration while the QoS of FUs is ignored.
In other words, we do not intend to ensure or enhance the
QoS of FUs. Transmit beamforming vectors are designed for
the cooperative FBSs to improve the secrecy rate of the eaves-
dropped MU, and no interference is generated to the other MUs.
The STB-SMF is an altruistic manner from the view point of
the FBSs. A more practical scheme is developed in the next
subsection, where the QoS of FUs is considered. Despite this
fact, the STB-SMF proposed in this subsection serves as a
preliminary scheme which provides us the first insight into the
interference-aided physical layer security enhancement in Het-
Net. Furthermore, the STB-SMF scheme also acts as a design
alternative for achieving the tradeoff between the performance
and the implementation complexity. Compared to the practical
scheme proposed in the next subsection, less cooperation and
computation are required by the STB-SMF.
C. Secrecy Transmit Beamforming Jointly Performed in
Macrocell and Femtocell (STB-JMF)
In the STB-SMF scheme, CCI is deliberately introduced
and exploited. The secrecy rate performance of MU1 is thus
enhanced, and the QoS of the other MUs is also guaranteed.
Nevertheless, the QoS of the co-channel FUs is ignored, which
implies that we cannot ensure the sum-rate performance of the
FUs of the cooperative FBSs.
In this section, we propose a joint secrecy transmit beam-
forming scheme named STB-JMF to improve the secrecy rate
of MU1 while ensuring the QoS of the other MUs and FUs.
Note that the SONOSA is also used in the STB-JMF scheme to
take advantage of the CCI from the point of secrecy. Our goal is
to maximize the secrecy rate of MU1 subject to the MBS/FBSs
transmit power constraints and the SINR requirements at the
other MUs and FUs. The transmit beamforming vectors of both
the MBS and the cooperative FBSs are optimized jointly. To
be more specific, each cooperative FBS obtains its local CSI
and then sends it to the MBS. As a result, global CSI becomes
available at the MBS. Then, the MBS jointly optimizes the
beamforming vectors with the aid of the global CSI.
Following the analysis in the previous sections, we can
formulate the original optimization problem as
max
{wm}Mm=1,
{{wnk}Kk=1}Nn=1
log2(1+SINR1)−log2(1+SINRE) (24a)
s.t.
M∑
m=1
‖wm‖2 ≤ PM ,
K∑
k=1
‖wnk‖2 ≤ PF , n ∈ [1, N ], (24b)
SINRm ≥ γm, m ∈ [2,M ], (24c)
SINRnk ≥ γnk, n ∈ [1, N ], k ∈ [1,K],
(24d)
where (24b) characterizes the total transmit power constraints
at the MBS and the cooperative FBSs, (24c) is the QoS require-
ment of intact user m in the macrocell, and (24d) is the QoS
requirement of FUnk. As we can see, the optimization problem
is non-convex and hence is very hard to solve. Despite the
challenge, in what follows we will show that the problem can
be solved globally optimally by reformulating it as a two-part
problem. Let Wm = wmwHm, Wnk = wnkwHnk, we can use
semidefinite relaxation technique [45] to simplify the problem.
First, we introduce a slack variable τ = SINRE , and (24) can
be equivalently transformed into
max
{wm}Mm=1,
{{wnk}Kk=1}Nn=1
1
1 + τ
[
1 +
Tr(H1W1)
A′1
]
(25a)
s.t.
M∑
m=1
Tr(Wm) ≤ PM , (25b)
K∑
k=1
Tr(Wnk) ≤ PF , n ∈ [1, N ], (25c)
Tr(HmWm)
A′m
≥ γm, m ∈ [2,M ], (25d)
Tr(Hn,nkWnk)
C ′nk
≥ γnk,
n ∈ [1, N ], k ∈ [1,K], (25e)
Tr(HEW1)
B′
≤ τ, (25f)
where A′1, A′m, B′ and C ′nk are respectively defined as
A′1=
M∑
m≥2
Tr(HmWm)+
N∑
n=1
K∑
k=1
Tr(Hn,1Wnk)+1, (26)
A′m =
M∑
q=1,q =m
Tr(HmWq) +
N∑
n=1
K∑
k=1
Tr(Hn,mWnk) + 1,
(27)
B′ =
M∑
m≥2
Tr(HEWm) +
N∑
n=1
K∑
k=1
Tr(Hn,EWnk) + 1,
(28)
C ′nk =
K∑
t=1,t =k
Tr(Hn,nkWnt)+
N∑
p=1,p =n
K∑
t=1
Tr(Hp,nkWpt)
+
M∑
m=1
Tr(HnkWm) + 1, (29)
Hn,m=h
H
n,mhn,m, Hn,E=h
H
n,Ehn,E , Hn,nk=h
H
n,nkhn,nk,
Hp,nk = h
H
p,nkhp,nk and Hnk = hHnkhnk.
To solve the problem (25), we divided it into two parts. The
outer part is a one-dimensional line search problem with τ , i.e.,
max
τ
1 +G(τ)
1 + τ
s.t. 0 ≤ τ ≤ Tr(H1)PM . (30)
The function G(τ) is defined by another optimization problem
to be described later. The lower bound about τ can be obtained
directly from (25f), while the upper bound is derived from
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the fact that the secrecy rate is greater than or equal to zero,
hence τ ≤ Tr(H1)PM . For a fixed τ , the inner part can be
expressed as
max
{Wm}Mm=1,{{Wnk}Kk=1}Nn=1
Tr(H1W1)
A′1
s.t. (25b)− (25f), (31)
and G(τ) is equal to the optimal value of (31).
It is observed that the problem (30) is equivalent to the
original problem (25). For any fixed τ , we can obtain G(τ) by
solving (31). Then, applying the one-dimensional line search
method, e.g., Golden Section Search, to the interval [1, 1 +
Tr(H1)PM ], we can solve the problem (25). Hence, the key
step is to solve (31) for a fixed τ . In what follows, we will
concentrate on it.
Since, the objective function of (31) is a linear fractional
function and thus it is quasi-convex [46], then we can use
Charnes-Cooper transformation [47] to convert it into a linear
one. Upon introducing the auxiliary variables Xm,Xnk  0,
ζ > 0, we can rewrite Wm and Wnk as Wm = Xmζ ,
Wnk =
Xnk
ζ , then the problem (31) can be transformed into
the problem (32), shown at the bottom of the next page.
It can be seen that the problem (32) is an SDP problem [45],
which can be solved efficiently by using numerical solvers such
as CVX [43]. The optimal solution of the problem (32) is denoted
by (X∗m,X∗nk, ζ∗). Hence the corresponding optimal solution
of the problem (31) can be obtained as W∗m = X
∗
m
ζ∗ , W
∗
nk =
X∗
nk
ζ∗ . Then, we can solve the problem (30) through the one-
dimensional line search method such as Golden Section Search.
Note that to get the finial solution, we need to solve a sequence
of SDPs.
Let us denote the optimal solution of the problem (30) as
(W˜m,W˜nk). Then, we can obtain the beamforming vector
solution as follows: if rank(W˜m) = 1, the optimal beamform-
ing vector w˜m is exactly obtained via eigenvalue decompo-
sition; otherwise some rank-one approximation procedures,
e.g., Gaussian randomization [48] can be applied to W˜m for
obtaining w˜m. The same procedure is applicable to W˜nk. For
the sake of clarity, the proposed STB-JMF is summarized in
Algorithm 3.
Algorithm 3 STB-JMF
1) Initialization: Set PM , PF , γm, γnk, ε (the search precision
of the Golden Section Search);
2) Compute τmax = Tr(H1)PM ;
3) Solve (30) by applying one-dimensional line search
method, e.g., the Golden Section Search, on interval
[1, τmax], obtaining the optimal τ ∗. To do this, we have to
solve (32) to obtain G∗(τ) for a fixed τ .
4) Obtain (X∗m,X∗nk, ζ∗) for τ ∗.
5) Let W∗m = X
∗
m
ζ∗ , W
∗
nk =
X∗
nk
ζ∗ .
6) If rank(W∗m) = rank(W∗nk) = 1, we can obtain w∗m and
w∗nk via eigenvalue decomposition;
7) Otherwise we apply Gaussian randomization method to
W∗m and W∗nk for finding approximate w∗m and w∗nk.
8) End
Proposition 1: The optimal solution {Xm}Mm=1,
{{Xnk}Kk=1}
N
n=1 of Problem (32) is always rank-one.
Proof: Please see Appendix. 
Proposition 1 shows that using semidefinite relaxation is
always tight and yields a rank-one solution for the STB-JMF.
Remark 6: In the STB-JMF, not only the QoS of MUs but
also the QoS of FUs are taken into consideration. In other
words, we can guarantee the QoS of all the legitimate users
in both the macrocell and the cooperative femtocells. This
is pragmatically attractive because QoS is one of the most
important performance metrics for practical HetNet.
Remark 7: The STB-JMF scheme is capable of satisfying
the QoS requirements as well as enhancing the secrecy rate
performance of the eavesdropped MU, which is in contrast to
the sole beamforming in STB-OM and the sequential beam-
forming in STB-SMF. The cooperative FBSs need to share their
local CSI with the MBS. The CSI of all the MUs and FUs are
available at the MBS, so that the transmit beamforming vectors
for the MBS and FBSs are all designed at the MBS. Then, the
MBS delivers the related beamforming matrices to the coop-
erative FBSs.
Remark 8: The proposed three STB schemes exploit the
cooperation among network nodes in varying degrees. In the
STB-OM scheme, no cooperation is used. In STB-SMF, each
cooperative FBS designs transmit beamforming vectors sepa-
rately for the sake of enhancing the secrecy rate performance of
the eavesdropped MU. A scalar needs to be fed back to the MBS
from each cooperative FBS to assist the secrecy beamforming at
the MBS. In STB-JMF, all the cooperative FBSs have to share
the CSI with the MBS, and the transmit beamforming vectors
for the MBS and FBSs are jointly designed at the MBS to
satisfy universal QoS requirements, which cannot be supported
by the STB-OM and STB-SMF schemes. Moreover, it is worth
pointing out that no data sharing is required for any of the
proposed STB schemes, which ensures low traffic load on the
backhaul links.
Remark 9: Based on [49], we derive the computational com-
plexity of the proposed algorithms as follows. Firstly, the com-
putational complexity of Algorithm 1 is TI · O(NMM3.5 +
N3MM
2.5) · log2( 1 ). Since Algorithm 2 is based on
Algorithm 1 and the only difference is that Algorithm 2
has to first calculate the interference caused by each
FBS, the computational complexity of Algorithm 2 is
then characterized by (N · O(N3FK +NFK2) + TI ·
O(NMM3.5 +N3MM2.5)) · log2( 1 ). Finally, Algorithm 3
is based on SDP and one-dimensional line search, and its
computational complexity is TS · O(NK(N3.5M +N3.5F ) +
N2K2(N2.5M + N
2.5
F ) + N
3K3(N0.5M +N
0.5
F )) · log2( 1 ),
where 
 denotes the accuracy requirement, TI is the number of
iterations required in Algorithms 1 and 2, and TS is the number
of searches carried out in Algorithm 3. As we can see, the
computational complexity of Algorithm 3 is higher than that of
Algorithms 1 and 2.
Remark 10: It is easy to extend the proposed schemes to
the scenario where there are multiple eavesdroppers. The only
difference is that the resultant optimization problem has to
consider the SINR constraints of multiple eavesdroppers. Then,
we can use the proposed algorithms to solve them. For the
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Fig. 6. An example channel model for STB-JMF scheme, consisting of one
MBS, M = 2 MUs, N = 2 FBSs, and K = 1 FU at each femtocell. An
eavesdropper wiretaps the first MU in the macrocell. As the SONOSA strategy
is used, the channel model is equivalent to an interference channel model.
The solid lines indicate useful data streams, and the dash lines indicate the
interference streams. The blue glow dotted lines indicate the CSI streams
delivered from FBSs to the MBS. The red dash-dot lines denote the STB vectors
delivered from the MBS to the FBSs.
scenario where multiple legitimate MUs are targeted by the
eavesdroppers, we may maximize either the secrecy sum-rate
of the network or the minimum secrecy rate of the legitimate
MUs, and the process of solving them is similar to the proposed
algorithms.
IV. SIMULATION RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS
In this section, simulation results are provided to evaluate
the secrecy rate of MU1 for different transmit beamforming
schemes conceived. We consider a downlink HetNet with a
central MBS serving a circular region C and the area of C is
denoted as C. We suppose the radius of C is 500m. The FBSs
are spatially distributed according to a Poisson point process
ϕf with intensity λf [50]. Therefore, the average number of
FBSs within the cellular coverage is given by NFBS = λfC.
Femtocells are derived from the Voronoi tessellation and we
can attain the stochastic geometry model [36] for the cellular
systems illustrated in Fig. 2. The simplified system models
of the three proposed STB schemes have been illustrated by
Figs. 3, 5, and 6 respectively. In all simulations, the antenna
configurations of the MBS and the FBS are NM = 10 and
NF = 4, respectively. The number of MUs is M = 2, and the
number of FUs in each FBS is K = 1. We also assume all
MUs, FUs and the eavesdropper are single-antenna nodes due
to practical constraint. For STB-SMF and STB-JMF schemes,
we assume there are two cooperative FBSs helping improve the
secrecy rate,5 and each cooperative FBS serves one FU. Ac-
cording to the ITU-R channel simulation specifications [51], we
5Our numerical results, which are not provided here due to page limitations,
show that two cooperative FBSs are enough for achieving good secrecy perfor-
mance. This is because when the number of cooperative FBSs increases, the
interference imposed on the wiretapped MU also increases, hence the secrecy
performance may not see any notable improvement.
max
{Xm}Mm=1,ζ
{{Xnk}Kk=1}Nn=1
Tr(H1X1) (32a)
s.t.
M∑
m=1
Tr(Xm) ≤ PMζ, (32b)
K∑
k=1
Tr(Xnk) ≤ PF ζ, (32c)
Tr(HmXm) ≥ γm
⎛
⎜⎝ M∑
q=1,
q =m
Tr(HmXq) +
N∑
n=1
K∑
k=1
Tr(Hn,mXnk) + ζ
⎞
⎟⎠ , (32d)
Tr(Hn,nkXnk) ≥ γnk
⎛
⎜⎝ K∑
t=1,
t =k
Tr(Hn,nkXnt) +
N∑
p=1
p=n
K∑
t=1
Tr(Hp,nkXpt) +
M∑
m=1
Tr(HnkXm) + ζ
⎞
⎟⎠ ,
(32e)
Tr(HEX1) ≤ τ
(
M∑
m=2
Tr(HEXm) +
N∑
n=1
K∑
k=1
Tr(Hn,EXnk) + ζ
)
, (32f)
M∑
m=2
Tr(HmXm) +
N∑
n=1
K∑
k=1
Tr(Hn,mXnk) + ζ = 1, (32g)
Xm,Xnk  0, ζ > 0. (32h)
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Fig. 7. The secrecy rate of MU1 versus the transmit power of the MBS. In the
STB-SMF and STB-JMF schemes, two FBSs are used to generate interference.
assume that the MBS has larger transmit power than the FBSs
and the specific numerical values are given in the following.
Moreover, the channel is modeled as a Rayleigh fading channel
in all the simulations.
A. Benchmark Scheme
The benchmark scheme is designed as follows. First, we aim
to maximize the rate of the wiretapped MU, i.e., MU1, with-
out the consideration of secrecy, and obtain the non-secrecy-
oriented beamforming vectors for the legitimate MUs and the
FUs within the cooperative femtocells. Then, we derive the se-
crecy rate of MU1 with the non-secrecy-oriented beamforming
vectors, which serves as our benchmark scheme. To be more
specific, this optimization problem can be expressed as
max
{wm}Mm=1,
{{wnk}Kk=1}Nn=1
log2(1 + SINR1) (33a)
s.t.
M∑
m=1
‖wm‖ ≤ PM ,
K∑
k=1
‖wnk‖ ≤ PF , n ∈ [1, N ], (33b)
SINRm ≥ γm, m ∈ [2,M ], (33c)
SINRnk ≥ γnk, n ∈ [1, N ], k ∈ [1,K],
(33d)
where (33b) characterizes the transmit power constraint at the
MBS and FBSs, while (33c) and (33d) represent the QoS
requirements of the legitimate MUs and the FUs, respectively.
Note that this nonconvex problem can be transformed into
an SDP problem, which is convex, by dropping a rank-one
constraint that emerges in the transformation process and has
Fig. 8. The secrecy rate of MU1 versus the transmit power of each FBS.
the form of rank(X) = 1. For more details, please refer to the
process of transforming the problem (31) into the problem (32).
Upon finishing the optimization, we can obtain the secrecy rate
of MU1. This scheme has been considered by [15], [28].
B. Performance of the Proposed Schemes
Fig. 7 shows the comparison results regarding MU1’s secrecy
rate performances with different schemes for PF = 40 dB.
Because the wiretapped MU1 receives more power but the
received noise power does not rise when the transmit power
of the MBS increases, so we can observe that the secrecy rate
performance of all the four schemes grow as the transmit power
of MBS increases. It is also shown that the secrecy rates of
the proposed three STB schemes always increase faster than
the benchmark scheme, especially when the transmit power
of the MBS is high (e.g., 42 dBm and 45 dBm). Obviously,
the secrecy rate performance of STB-JMF and STB-SMF is
better than that of STB-OM. This observation verifies that the
deliberately introduced interference is capable of enhancing
enhance the secrecy rate performance of the eavesdropped MU.
Furthermore, it is worth noting that Rs of STB-SMF slightly
outperforms STB-JMF at all the transmit power values of the
MBS, since STB-SMF does not consider the QoS of FUs.
Fig. 8 illustrates the secrecy rate of MU1 for the STB-
SMF and STB-JMF schemes under various FBS transmit power
values. It is shown that in all schemes the secrecy rate of
MU1 improves as we increase the transmit power of FBS.
Note that the benchmark scheme could finally catch up our
schemes at the cost of very high FBS power. However, even
with little transmit power at each FBS, the proposed schemes
can achieve very high secrecy rate, which is in sharp contract
to the benchmark scheme. This indicates that STB-SMF and
STB-JMF are able to achieve a better Rs without the need to
increase the transmit power of each cooperative FBS. To better
illustrate the behaviors of STB-SMF and STB-JMF, we plot the
secrecy rate of MU1 versus the transmit power of the MBS and
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Fig. 9. The secrecy rate region of MU1 versus the transmit power of the MBS
and each FBS.
Fig. 10. The receive SINR of FUs versus the transmit power of the MBS.
one cooperative FBS in a three-dimensional figure in Fig. 9,
where we can observe the variation tendency of secrecy rate
more clearly.
Fig. 10 shows that the averaged SINR of FUs versus the
transmit power of the MBS when there is an eavesdropper
wiretapping MU1. Due to symmetry, we only need to evaluate
the averaged SINR of the FU in one cooperative femtocell,
and we assume the SINR requirement of FUs in STB-JMF
scheme is 0.60. From Fig. 10, it is observed that the SINR
of FUs in STB-JMF achieves its optimum and is significantly
superior to that in STB-SMF. We can also conclude that the
SINR constraints (24d) in STB-JMF hold with equality. But
for the STB-SMF scheme, as the transmit power of the MBS
increases, the SINR of FUs goes down dramatically because
more interference is introduced at FUs.
Fig. 11 shows the averaged SINR of each FU versus the
transmit power of each FBS when there is an eavesdropper
Fig. 11. The receive SINR of FUs versus the transmit power of each FBS.
wiretapping MU1. Similarly, the SINR requirement of FUs in
STB-JMF is set as 0.60. We can also see that STB-JMF has
advantages related to the averaged SINR of FU. It is worth
noting that when the transmit power of each FBS is relatively
low, e.g., around 20 dBm, the SINR constraint in STB-JMF
could not be satisfied and thus there is no optimal solution.
Hence, we slightly decrease the SINR requirement of FUs to
0.5 to ensure that the optimization problem can be solved. So
in Fig. 11, at the point of 20dBm, we can see the averaged
SINR decreases slightly. However, from Figs. 10 and 11, we can
clearly see that the benefit of STB-JMF is to maximize secrecy
rate of the wiretapped MU while maintaining QoS for all related
FUs and the intended MU.
C. Impact of Artificial Noise (AN) on the Proposed Schemes
AN plays an important role in the physical layer security
and may achieve substantial secrecy performance in some
scenarios. In what follows we provide some simulations to
verify whether AN is still beneficial for our schemes. To this
end, AN is introduced into the STB-OM, the STB-SMF and
the STB-JMF in these simulations. Furthermore, except for the
beamforming schemes proposed in this paper, we also present
two additional schemes for the purpose of comparison in these
simulations, which are the “joint beamforming and AN design”
as well as the “beamforming design with random AN”.
Let us consider the broadcast channel as an example, then the
optimization problem of “joint beamforming and AN design”
can be expressed as
max
{wm}Mm=1,z
log(1 + SINR1)− log(1 + SINRE) (34a)
s.t. SINRm ≥ γm, m ∈ [2,M ], (34b)
M∑
m=1
‖wm‖2 + ‖z‖ ≤ PM , (34c)
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Fig. 12. Two-user interference channel with an eavesdropper.
Fig. 13. The secrecy rate versus the transmit power of the MBS in the
broadcast channel with/without AN.
where SINRm and SINRE are the received SINRs at MUm and
at the eavesdropper E, respectively. These SINRs are given by
SINRm =
|hmwm|2
σ2M +
∑M
q=1,q =m |hmwq|2 + |hmz|2
, (35)
SINRE =
|hEw1|2
σ2E +
∑M
m=2 |hEwm|2 + |hEz|2
, (36)
where z is the AN vector. Hence, we can solve this optimization
problem using Algorithm 1 proposed in this paper. Note that
this model mimics the effect of AN in the STB-OM.
On the other hand, considering the “beamforming design
with random AN” for the broadcast channel, we transmit
random AN and the optimized beamforming vectors at the
MBS. The optimization problem is similar to (34) except that
the optimization variables are only {wm}Mm=1, which do not
include z.
Fig. 14. The secrecy rate versus the transmit power of transmitters in the
interference channel with/without AN.
Note that the STB-SMF and the STB-JMF rely on an inter-
ference channel. For simplicity, we only consider the typical
scenario where there are two transmitters each having four
antennas, two receivers each having a single antenna and one
single-antenna eavesdropper trying to wiretap one of the trans-
mitters, as shown in Fig. 12.
We present the simulation results for the broadcast channel
(as shown in Fig. 13) and for the interference channel (as
shown in Fig. 14). From Figs. 13 and 14, we can see that
the secrecy rate of the system is almost the same for the
proposed schemes whether there exists AN (joint design) or
not. Therefore, we can conclude that transmitting AN using the
additional NM −M dimensions does not have any significant
impact on the performance of the proposed schemes. This is
because in the proposed STB-OM scheme, we assume that there
are multiple MUs, thus the MBS has to transmit multiple data
flows. Therefore, the STB-OM relies on a broadcast channel.
At the eavesdropper, the data from other legitimate MUs can
be regarded as interference. For the STB-SMF and the STB-
JMF, the data from FBSs can also be treated as interference.
These interferences are essentially equivalent to the special
ANs imposed on the eavesdropper.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have investigated the physical-layer security
schemes in a two-tier downlink HetNet. On the basis of the
two suggested spectrum allocation strategies, the OSA and the
SONOSA, three STB schemes, i.e., STB-OM, STB-SMF and
STB-JMF, have been proposed to maximize the secrecy rate
of the eavesdropped user. According to various considerations
of the QoS requirements of the legitimate users, the three
proposed secrecy schemes adopt different degrees of collab-
oration among MBS and its cooperative FBSs. In particular,
the complicated nonconvex STB optimization problems have
been solved by problem reformulations with SDP and SOCP
techniques. Simulation results show the effectiveness of the
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proposed schemes. For the future work, it would be interesting
to consider the scenario where multiple eavesdroppers and/or
targeted MUs exist in the HetNet. Additionally, the robust STB
schemes in the context of imperfect CSI may be investigated.
APPENDIX
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1
The maximization problem (32) can be equivalently trans-
formed into
min
{Xm}Mm=1,ζ
{{Xnk}Kk=1}Nn=1
Tr(HEX1) (37a)
s.t.
M∑
m=1
Tr(Xm) ≤ PMζ, (37b)
K∑
k=1
Tr(Xnk) ≤ PF ζ, n ∈ [1, N ], (37c)
Tr(HmXm) ≥ γm
⎛
⎜⎝ M∑
q=1,
q =m
Tr(HmXq)
+
N∑
n=1
K∑
k=1
Tr(Hn,mXnk)+ζ
⎞
⎟⎠, m∈ [2,M ],
(37d)
Tr(Hn,nkXnk) ≥ γnk
⎛
⎜⎝ K∑
t=1,
t =k
Tr(Hn,nkXnt)
+
N∑
p=1
p=n
K∑
t=1
Tr(Hp,nkXpt)
+
M∑
m=1
Tr(HnkXm) + ζ
⎞
⎟⎠,
n ∈ [1, N ], k ∈ [1,K], (37e)
Tr(H1X1) ≥ τ
(
M∑
m=2
Tr(HmXm)
+
N∑
n=1
K∑
k=1
Tr(Hn,1Xnk) + ζ
)
, (37f)
M∑
m=2
Tr(HEXm)
+
N∑
n=1
K∑
k=1
Tr(Hn,EXnk) + ζ = 1, (37g)
Xm, Xnk  0, ζ > 0. (37h)
It is easy to verify that Problem (37) satisfies the Slater’s
condition. Then, the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions
are the sufficient and necessary optimality conditions. Some
KKT conditions needed in the proof are expressed as follows:
G∗1 = a
∗I+HE +
M∑
m=2
b∗mγmHm
+
N∑
n=1
K∑
k=1
c∗nkγnkHnk − d∗H1, (38a)
G∗1X1 =0, (38b)
G∗m = a
∗I+
M∑
q =1,m
b∗qγqHq +
N∑
n=1
K∑
k=1
c∗nkγnkHnk
+ d∗τHm + e∗HE − b∗mHm, m = 1, (38c)
G∗mXm =0, m = 1, (38d)
G∗nk = a
∗
nI+
M∑
m=2
b∗mγmHn,m +
K∑
t =k
c∗ntγntHn,nt
+
N∑
p =n
K∑
k=1
c∗pkγpkHn,pk + d
∗τHn,1 − c∗nkHn,nk,
n ∈ [1, N ], k ∈ [1,K], (38e)
G∗nkXnk =0, n ∈ [1, N ], k ∈ [1,K], (38f)
where G∗m  0, m ∈ [1,M ], G∗nk  0, n ∈ [1, N ], k ∈ [1,K],
a∗ ≥ 0, a∗n ≥ 0, bm ≥ 0, cnk ≥ 0, d ≥ 0, e ≥ 0 are the optimal
dual variables associated with the constraints Xm,Xnk  0
and (37b)–(37g), respectively.
Note that (38a), (38c) and (38e) have a similar struc-
ture, hence we only focus on the proof of rank(X∗1) = 1.
rank(X∗m) = 1, m ∈ [2,M ], and rank(X∗nk) = 1, n ∈ [1, N ],
k ∈ [1,K], can be proved by using the same method.
If X∗1 = 0, the resultant secrecy rate is zero, which is trivial.
Then, we have X∗1 = 0. According to (38b), the rank of G∗1
must be less than or equal to n− 1, i.e.,
rank (G∗1) ≤ n− 1. (39)
An important observation is that with the optimal solution,
the power constraints (37b) and (37c) have to be satisfied
with equality [42]. Therefore, we have a∗ > 0 and a∗n > 0,
n ∈ [1, N ]. Let
V = a∗I+HE +
M∑
m=2
b∗mγmHm +
N∑
n=1
K∑
k=1
c∗nkγnkHnk
=
(
V
1
2
)2
 0, (40)
where V 12 =
(
V
1
2
)H
 0, then the rank of G∗1 can be further
expressed as
rank(G∗1) = rank(V − d∗H1)
= rank
(
V
1
2 (I− d∗H1)V 12
)
a
= rank
(
I− d∗V− 12H1V− 12
)
≥ n− 1, (41)
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where the equation a holds true relying on the following fact
rank(B) = rank(AB) = rank(BC) = rank(ABC), (42)
where Am×m and Cn×n are both non-singular matrices, and
Bm×n is an arbitrary matrix.
From (39) and (41), we have rank(G∗1) = n− 1. Ac-
cording to (38b), we have rank(X∗1) ≤ dim(N (G∗1)) = n−
rank(G∗1) = 1. Since X∗1 = 0, we obtain rank(X∗1) = 1.
Following the same procedure, we are capable of proving that
rank(X∗m) = 1, m ∈ [2,M ], and rank(X∗nk) = 1, n ∈ [1, N ],
k ∈ [1,K]. Hence, we have completed the proof.
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